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Abstract 
This article argues that the legal regime applicable to cohabitants on separation is based on 
liberal ideals of individual autonomy and self-sufficiency.  This can be seen chiefly in the 
preference for financial contributions in order to establish a constructive trust.  The 
preference for financial contributions marginalises and stigmatises those who make ‘caring 
contributions’ within an intimate relationship and are thus unable to conform to the ideal, 
economically independent legal subject.  The article proposes that property disputes between 
former intimate partners should instead be analysed through the lens of vulnerability theory.  
It argues that so-called ‘relational vulnerability’ occurs where an individual undertakes caring 
or domestic labour within the context of an intimate relationship, and suffers economic 
hardship as a result.  The state has a duty to respond to this vulnerability through distribution 
of property on separation.  The article further suggests that vulnerability theory provides a 
preferable basis for analysing disputes to liberal theory, as it avoids the tendency to rely on 
concepts such as altruism and needs when explaining caring contributions and the law’s 
response to them.2   
                                                          
1 I presented an earlier version of this paper at the Critical Legal Conference, University of Kent in September 2016 and 
would like to thank the participants in the Vulnerability stream for their helpful comments.  I would also like to thank my 
supervisors at the University of Birmingham, Professor Rosie Harding and Dr Tatiana Cutts.   
2 This article focuses on disputes in the ‘domestic context’ rather than those where the parties are in a commercial 
relationship with one another.  Undoubtedly, different considerations would apply to commercial contexts, but these are 
beyond the scope of the article.   
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Introduction  
A major criticism of the law applicable to property disputes between former cohabiting partners 
is that it does not adequately recognise what can be termed ‘caring contributions’.3 These 
contributions can include child rearing, domestic labour and unpaid work in a family business. 
English property law, with its roots in liberal theory, expresses a clear preference for easily 
quantifiable contributions, as famously seen in Lloyds Bank v Rosset,4 where, to establish a 
constructive trust, Lord Bridge thought that it was “at least extremely doubtful”5 whether 
anything less than direct monetary contributions to the purchase price would suffice in order 
to infer a common intention to share the beneficial interest in the property. Previous cases such 
as Burns v Burns6 had already established the hard-nosed nature of property law and its 
potential harshness on the homemaker and carer. More recent cases have also demonstrated the 
precarious position of a claimant whose sole contribution has been in the form of caring either 
for the home or for dependants.7 I do not propose to discuss the constructive trust case law at 
length in this article. As mentioned, there has been extensive scholarship on this issue. Instead, 
I intend to set out how a different theoretical perspective, namely vulnerability theory, can be 
used as a lens through which to view property disputes between former cohabitants. In this 
article, I argue that adopting a version of the theory that I term relational vulnerability can offer 
a perspective that is more inclusive of caring contributions than the current law.   
Broad and narrow versions of vulnerability theory 
Vulnerability theory has developed as a critique of the dominant liberal ideology underlying 
legal and political policy. Liberal autonomy is often associated with the work of Kant and his 
                                                          
3 See for example Anne Barlow, ‘Configuration (s) of Unpaid Caregiving within Current Legal Discourse In and Around the 
Family”’ (2007) 58 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 251, 260 and Rebecca Bailey-Harris, ‘Law and the Unmarried Couple-
Oppression or Liberation?’ (1996) 8 Child & Fam. LQ 137, 139 
4 Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1991]1 AC 107 
5 Ibid, 133 (Lord Bridge) 
6 Burns v Burns [1984]Ch 317 
7 See for example James v Thomas [2007]EWCA Civ 1212, Curran v Collins [2015]EWCA Civ 404, Geary v Rankine 
[2012]EWCA Civ 555 and Smith v Bottomley [2013]EWCA Civ 953 
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theory of internal moral law,8 but also subsequent scholarship such as Rawls’ theory of justice,9 
Raz’s liberal perfectionism10 and contemporary theories of individual freedom by Dworkin11 
and Frankfurt.12 Liberal accounts view autonomy as political freedom and the ability of the 
individual to form rational judgments that are unconstrained by external factors. Within liberal 
theory, autonomy has come to be synonymous with individualism, as can be seen in the work 
of Mill, who defends the development of individuality as worthwhile in itself.13 Autonomy 
under the liberal model is viewed as an internal concept in that the rational, autonomous 
individual is not restrained by his relationships with others. Relationships that do restrain the 
individual from exercising free will are viewed as harmful and contrary to autonomy.  
Formosa argues that vulnerability theorists have tended to take either a ‘broad’ or a ‘narrow’ 
view of vulnerability.14 Within the broad view, Martha Fineman’s work has been particularly 
influential in exposing the manner in which liberal theories of autonomy tolerate and perpetuate 
significant social inequalities.15 Fineman argues that legal theory needs to acknowledge the 
individual as inherently vulnerable, in that he or she is variously dependent on others for care 
and is susceptible to illness or injury, throughout life.16  Fineman’s view of vulnerability is that 
it is universal, constant and inevitable. It is not possible under Fineman’s account for an 
individual to be ‘invulnerable’,17 although the vulnerability of some is more visible than others 
at times. Instead, she argues that humans possess different degrees of ‘resilience’ to 
                                                          
8 See Mary J Gregor and Roger J Sullivan (eds), Immanuel Kant: The metaphysics of morals, vol 19 (Cambridge University 
Press Cambridge 1996) 
9 John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971) 
10 Joseph Raz The morality of freedom (Oxford University Press, 1986) 
11 Gerald Dworkin The theory and practice of autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
12 Harry G Frankfurt Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person (Springer, 1988) 
13 John Stuart Mill On liberty (Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1869) 
14 Paul  Formosa ‘The Role of Vulnerability in Kantian Ethics’ in C Mackenzie, W Rogers and S Dodds (eds), Vulnerability: 
New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2014) , 88 
15 See Martha Albertson Fineman The autonomy myth: A theory of dependency (The New Press, 2004), 31 and Martha 
Albertson Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’ (2010) 60 Emory LJ 251, 251 
16 Ibid  
17 Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘Public Lecture: Vulnerability and Resilience: An Emerging Paradigm ’ (University of 
Birmingham, 14/09/2015)  
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vulnerability.18 Resilience can come in various forms, including access to resources or specific 
groups and networks. Resilience does not remove vulnerability, but rather renders it less 
visible. Fineman constructs her theory around the ‘vulnerable legal subject’ and his or her needs 
and the state’s duty to respond to vulnerability.19 The broad version of vulnerability is 
compelling in that it avoids the problems of focusing on defined groups of vulnerable 
individuals, with the risk of inadvertently stigmatising these. However, Mackenzie at al have 
remarked that an excessively broad definition of inherent vulnerability fails to recognise that 
many forms of vulnerability are avoidable and arise as a result of unequal relationships or 
unequal social structures. In this article, I argue that relational vulnerability is avoidable and 
can be addressed by counteracting and responding to the effects of unequal relationships. 
Additionally, Hurst has argued that a broad definition of vulnerability is too loose to offer a 
practical solution.20 By labelling all individuals vulnerable, vulnerability risks becoming an 
empty concept.21 Certainly, it could be argued that all individuals are vulnerable following 
relationship breakdown. This does not by itself justify legal intervention and therefore 
relational vulnerability focuses on those who are more adversely impacted than others.  
Narrow versions of vulnerability theory argue that an individual is vulnerable only if he or she 
is more susceptible to harm than others. The focus is on vulnerability that arises as a result of 
societal and relational inequalities that have permitted the repression of certain individuals. In 
this sense, vulnerability is defined as a reduced ability to protect one’s own interests as a result 
of a particular social condition. Goodin’s work focuses on the extent to which relational aspects 
make certain individuals particularly susceptible to harm.22 Goodin’s definition of vulnerability 
therefore moves beyond the biological and universal aspects of vulnerability in order to focus 
                                                          
18 Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’, above at n 15, 270 
19 Ibid, 267 
20 Samia A Hurst, ‘Vulnerability in research and health care; describing the elephant in the room?’ (2008) 22 Bioethics 191 
21 See also Formosa, above at n 14, and Doris Schroeder and Eugenijus Gefenas, ‘Vulnerability: Too vague and too broad?’ 
(2009) 18 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 113 
22 Robert Goodin Protecting the vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities (University of Chicago Press, 1985) 
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on specific sources of social inequality. Goodin focuses on those relationships where there is 
an inequality of vulnerability and where there is greater potential for exploitation. He argues 
that the essence of vulnerability is that it is socially created rather than a natural and 
unchangeable phenomenon. It is therefore capable of being challenged and eliminated, rather 
than being something that must be accommodated.  
Mackenzie et al have acknowledged the tensions between the narrow and the broad view.23 
Their proposed taxonomy acknowledges instead the various sources of human vulnerability. 
They distinguish between inherent vulnerability, which occurs as a result of biological 
processes and situational vulnerability, in which external circumstances such as war or 
incarceration operate in order to render the subject temporarily vulnerable.24 Additionally, they 
identify pathogenic vulnerability as a form of situational vulnerability arising as a result of 
adverse social conditions such as oppression, or in the context of oppressive interpersonal 
relationships. Pathogenic vulnerability can also occur as a result of measures intended to 
respond to vulnerability, but have the opposite effect, such as abuse of dependent individuals 
by their carers. Pathogenic vulnerability is described by the authors as “particularly ethically 
troubling”.25 Mackenzie et al also distinguish between vulnerability that is “dispositional” and 
that which is “occurrent”.26 Whereas dispositional vulnerability can describe the fact that 
certain sectors of the population are at higher risk of vulnerability than others, occurrent 
vulnerability refers to that which has or is taking place.  
The narrow version is not without problems of course. The emphasis on avoidable vulnerability 
may mean that there is a lack acceptance that there are numerous vulnerabilities that cannot be 
                                                          
23 Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers and Susan Dodds (eds), Vulnerability: new essays in ethics and feminist philosophy, 
vol (Oxford University Press 2014) 
24 Ibid, 7-9 
25 Ibid, 9 
26 Ibid, 7 
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avoided. As Formosa points out, it is not desirable to seek to eliminate all vulnerability.27 He 
argues that the narrow version risks pathologising vulnerability. Within the narrow version, it 
may also be implicitly assumed that those who are not vulnerable are ‘invulnerable’. For 
proponents of the broader view, that amounts to a fundamental misrepresentation of the human 
condition. Despite this, I argue that in the context of property disputes, a narrow theory offers 
a preferable basis for legal intervention.  
Relational vulnerability in domestic property disputes 
Mackenzie et al argue that a theory of vulnerability should be able to identify the obligations 
involved in responding to the vulnerability and the agents of institutions that should respond.28 
Relational vulnerability theory outlines how and why the court should redistribute (or 
distribute) property between intimate partners following relationship breakdown. It is a narrow 
version of the theory. Although it is recognised that biological functions such as ageing or 
illness may render an individual particularly vulnerable, this does not necessarily explain why 
reallocation of property rights should be the response.  
I define relational vulnerability as being an individual’s reduced capacity to deal with the 
economic effects of relationship breakdown, as a result of the manner in which the parties 
conducted their relationship. The intimate relationship itself is viewed as the source of 
vulnerability. Using Mackenzie et al’s taxonomy, it can be described as a form of situational 
vulnerability in that it is confined to those intimate relationships where the parties’ conduct has 
caused one partner to become economically disadvantaged. 
How does one measure such a reduction in capacity? Essentially, relational vulnerability is 
aimed at redressing an economic imbalance between the parties, recognising that the 
relationship may also have been a source of resilience for the stronger partner, at the weaker 
                                                          
27 Formosa, above at n14, 91 
28 Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds, above at n 23, 13 
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party’s expense. It cannot therefore be described as being merely a needs-based theory, as the 
relationship may have relieved the stronger party of obligations that would otherwise interfere 
with his or her ability to engage in economic activity. As a result, reduction in economic 
capacity can either be measured as against that of the stronger party, or by comparing the 
position that the vulnerable party would be in had it not been for the relationship.  
Although there are various ways in which an intimate relationship can cause vulnerability and 
imbalance, I have broken this down into four main categories.  These are traditional role 
allocation, economic sacrifice through caring, economic sacrifice through unpaid work and the 
loss of a chance. There is a certain degree of overlap between the categories and there will be 
cases where there are elements of several or all present.    
Traditional role allocation refers to parties in an intimate relationship dividing domestic and 
economic activity between them in an unbalanced manner. One party becomes the 
‘breadwinner’ and is essentially freed from domestic obligations in order to pursue economic 
activity. The other party is the ‘homemaker’ and performs the household labour that would 
otherwise be the parties’ joint responsibility. During the course of the relationship, the 
homemaker is wholly or partly financially dependent on the breadwinner. On separation, he or 
she is significantly disadvantaged as a result of a prolonged absence from the marketplace.  
Economic sacrifice in order to carry out caring obligations most commonly occurs in relation 
to childcare. Research by Crompton and Lyonette suggests that where a couple has children, 
the primary carer also tends to carry out a disproportionate share of the housework, so claimants 
in this category often overlap with the first category.29 While less common, this type of 
vulnerability can also occur in the context of caring for a dependent adult. Again, the 
vulnerability or disadvantage occurs because performing caring tasks impacts upon the 
                                                          
29 Rosemary Crompton and Clare Lyonette, ‘Who does the housework? The division of labour within the home’ (2008) 24 
British social attitudes 53 
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caregiver’s ability to participate in economic activity. There may be a period of absence from 
the workplace or a reduction in working hours or responsibility. This type of vulnerability can 
also be explained in terms of conferring a benefit on the economically stronger party, whose 
caring obligations are reduced as a result of the claimant’s actions. It is of course possible to 
argue that the work could be outsourced and that therefore, the benefit to the defendant is only 
a financial one. However, if a relational approach to caring is taken, such as that advocated by 
Herring, it can be said that there is a benefit to the defendant in that the care is performed by a 
family member.  
Economic sacrifice through unpaid employment refers to the scenario where the parties work 
on a commercial venture that only seeks to benefit one of them. There are numerous examples 
of joint business ventures in the case law, including James v Thomas,30 Thomson v Hurst,31 
Hammond v Mitchell32 and Curran v Collins.33 In this scenario, one party will have foregone 
the opportunity to undertake paid work, whereas the other party will have benefited financially 
from the other’s labour and potentially saved the cost of hiring additional employees.  
The final category is perhaps the most controversial and describes the loss of a chance on the 
part of the vulnerable party as a result of the relationship. Again, there is significant overlap 
with the other categories in that it describes the loss of ability to be able to participate in the 
marketplace and to acquire property of one’s own. However, it could also cover the loss of a 
chance to pursue other, potentially more personally or financially fulfilling relationships, 
including the opportunity to marry.34 I describe this category as controversial due to the 
uncertainty of ascertaining the claimant’s position but for the relationship. It involves 
                                                          
30 James v Thomas, above at n 7 
31 Thompson v Hurst [2012]EWCA 1752 
32 Hammond v Mitchell [1991]1 WLR 1127 
33 Curran v Collins, above at n7 
34 The lost opportunity of marriage was touched upon in Smith v Bottomley, above at n 7, [62] by Sales J, who mentioned the 
possibility of the claimant losing out on “more lucrative” offers as a result of her engagement to the defendant.  
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significant speculation and there may be a tendency for claimants to overstate their potential. 
It also potentially reduces relationships to their financial value and depicts them as being both 
expendable and easily replaceable.  
I do not intend the above categorisation to be absolute. It is simply used in this article as a 
means of explaining how relational vulnerability can occur. The theory envisages that the state 
(through the courts or the legislature) responds to relational inequality by ordering property 
redistribution. The aim is redressing an imbalance that has been caused by the relationship and 
in that sense, the theory does not merely respond to financial need. Instead, it responds to the 
fact that one party has been placed in a vulnerable position as a result of features of the intimate 
relationship.  
Responsibility for vulnerability- public or private? 
Before examining the concept of relational vulnerability in greater detail, it is necessary to 
consider whether the response to vulnerability should be a collective or state response, or 
whether resilient individuals can be compelled to take responsibility for vulnerable individuals. 
Fineman argues that the state through its various institutions bears ultimate responsibility for 
vulnerability and that the manner in which it currently responds is inadequate.35 She argues 
that responses to vulnerability tend to be in the form of equal-treatment initiatives that attempt 
to cast the problem as one between individuals. Equal treatment initiatives generally do not 
take into account the fact that the parties are in unequal positions as a result of unequal access 
to resources and opportunities.36  These responses also tend to be individualistic rather than 
focused on state or collective responsibility. For example, anti-discrimination legislation in the 
US is focused around identifying a perpetrator, intimating that discrimination is a private rather 
                                                          
35 For example Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 
20 Yale JL & Feminism 1, 6 
36 Ibid, 2 
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than a public matter that potentially affects us all.37 Equality legislation also usually relies on 
a hypothetical comparator in order to identify discrimination.38 This comparator is typically 
based on the liberal autonomous subject, reinforcing the idea that the vulnerable subject falls 
outside the norm.  
In particular, Fineman is critical of the image of the restrained state that underlies legal and 
political ideology. She argues that liberal theory seeks to minimise or eliminate the role of the 
state in addressing vulnerability by placing the responsibility on the individual or the family.39 
She describes the state as having withdrawn from its role as “principal monitor or guarantor of 
an equal society”.40 The solution for Fineman lies in a responsive state that takes responsibility 
for vulnerability thorough the creation of institutions that can support and subsidise caring 
work.41 Recognition of the fact that vulnerability is beyond individual control means that 
scrutiny can then turn to the institutions of the state whose creation and responsibility is to 
respond to vulnerability.  
Fineman argues that liberal theory has confined caring and dependency to the family.42 
Dependency is seen to be a private responsibility rather than a matter for the state. It is 
presented as a natural or a biological phenomenon, as is the family unit itself.43 For Fineman, 
the family (in its idealised, marital, form) is in fact a societal construct that provides normative 
encouragement for the view that dependency is a private matter. In Fineman’s view, there is 
no inherent reason why the family should be responsible for dependency rather than another 
                                                          
37 Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘Beyond Identities: The Limits of an Anti-Discrimination Approach to Equality’ (2012) 92 B 
U L Rev 1713, 13 
38 For example, under the Equality Act 2010, the comparator for the purposes of establishing discrimination is a person who 
does not share the protected characteristics set out in ss 4-12  
39 Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’, above at n 15, 11 
40 Ibid, 6 
41 Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’, above at n 15, 256 
42 Fineman 2004, above at n 15, 58 and Martha Albertson Fineman ‘Equality, Autonomy and the Vulnerable Subject in Law 
and Politics’ in M Albertson Fineman and A Grear (eds), Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law 
and Politics (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013) , 18 
43 Fineman 2004, above at n 15, xiii 
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state institution.44 The idea that another arm of the state could provide care in place of the 
family is contentious. For example, Herring argues that there is a strong relational element to 
care, and while the physical act of caring could potentially be outsourced, care also 
encompasses the bond between caregiver and cared-for.45 He argues that family and friends are 
particularly suited to providing care due to the pre-existing relationship.46 Similarly, Eichner 
has argued that care is best provided by the family, but that there needs to be state support in 
order to ensure that this can take place.47  
In a sense, my view of relational vulnerability presents some contradictions to Fineman’s 
theory, although I argue that the two are not fundamentally incompatible. By suggesting that 
the state responds to vulnerability through a regime of property redistribution between 
individuals, there is a potential accusation that the state is allowed to remain restrained, by 
allocating responsibility for vulnerability and dependency to the economically stronger partner. 
As a result, it does not directly compel the state to react to vulnerability by developing and 
strengthening its institutions and offering subsidies. It could be argued therefore that it allows 
dependency to remain a private issue, confined to the family unit. Moreover, relational 
vulnerability can be accused of failing to acknowledge the fact that the debt that is generated 
through caretaking is a collective one, meaning that the obligation to repay the caregiver should 
be societal rather than individual.  
My response to these criticisms is firstly that they are based on a broad definition of 
vulnerability as something that is universal and inevitable. By adopting a more nuanced and 
narrower definition of vulnerability (as I do), it is possible to distinguish between those 
vulnerabilities that are inevitable and due to biological processes and those that are the product 
                                                          
44 Ibid, 61 
45 Jonathan Herring Caring and the Law (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 4 
46 Ibid 
47 Maxine Eichner, ‘Dependency and the Liberal Polity: On Martha Fineman's" The Autonomy Myth"’ (2005) 93 California 
Law Review 1285 
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of specific societal conditions that encourage inequalities to remain. By only explaining the 
obligation as a collective rather than a private one, it does not address the vulnerability on a 
local level or provide a means of eradicating its source.  
In addition, state responsibility can be viewed in various ways. As Fineman herself points out, 
there is no such thing as an absent state.48 Even in apparently entirely private transactions such 
as contracts, the state determines which elements of the agreement are upheld. The difference 
is whether the state takes responsibility for guaranteeing equality for its subjects. 
Responsiveness therefore does not always need to be in the form of state subsidies. It can also 
occur through the process of acknowledging the ability of caring contributions to generate 
rights in property or by the making of policy decisions, emphasising the value of caring work. 
The current law clearly favours express agreements and monetary contributions. By permitting 
alternative forms of contribution as a basis for allocation of property rights, this would signal 
state recognition of the sacrifices made by caregivers.  
Moreover, responsibility for vulnerability solely through state subsidies carries its own 
potential problems. Firstly, it brings the risk of excessive dependence on the welfare state rather 
than fostering self-sufficiency and responsibility. Secondly, as Sloan points out, the potential 
cost to the state of caring is huge.49 Currently, unpaid informal carers carry out a large 
proportion of this, meaning that if the state were to take full responsibility, there would be an 
undue financial burden placed upon it. The sheer cost of the care bill would mean that the state 
would likely only be able to provide ‘baseline’ care at the minimum level. In addition, Herring 
argues that the state cannot provide the relational aspects of caring, only the performance of 
                                                          
48 See Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’, above at n 15, 6 
49 Brian Sloan Informal carers and private law (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012), 3 
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physical tasks. The emotional link between carer and caregiver is absent between the state and 
the individual.50  
Therefore, my focus on the transfer of resources between individuals is not fundamentally 
incompatible with a broader vulnerability theory. Nor is it incompatible with the notion of a 
responsive state. If vulnerability is defined as occurring on a more local level, it is the 
responsibility of the state to recognise and address this. The state can be responsive in other 
ways than through direct provision of subsidies. I argue that the recognition of inequality and 
power imbalance in relationships is an example of a responsive state rather than an example of 
continued privatisation of dependency and vulnerability.  
The advantages of relational vulnerability theory as a tool in property disputes 
I identify three major advantages of relational vulnerability over liberal theory. Firstly, I argue 
that if the law is to respond in a coherent manner, it must take into account the relational context 
of the dispute. Whereas liberal theory is generally resistant to regulation of intimacy, relational 
vulnerability allows for a response that directly addresses the structure of the relationship. 
Secondly, I argue that relational vulnerability offers the ability to view caring contributions as 
valuable in themselves and capable of generating property rights. Thirdly, relational 
vulnerability is able to maintain respect for individual autonomy, rather than risk becoming a 
solely needs-based theory.  
A relational approach to property division 
Traditionally, neither the constructive trust nor proprietary estoppel interrogated the nature of 
the parties’ relationship in detail. In fact, the historical ‘doctrine of family assets’51 was 
                                                          
50 Herring 2013, above at n 45, 20 
51 The doctrine of family assets was developed in a line of cases from the early 1940’s until the 1960’s, prior to the Family 
Law Reform Act 1969 and the subsequent Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 which put judicial discretion to redistribute 
property on divorce on a statutory footing. See for example Fribance v Fribance [1957]1 All ER 357, Rimmer v Rimmer 
[1953]1 QB 63and Ulrich v Ulrich [1968]1 All ER 67 
14 
 
criticised for implying that separate rules should apply where the parties’ were married.52 
However, more recent developments of the constructive trust (as seen in Stack v Dowden)53 
and proprietary estoppel (as seen in Thorner v Major)54 have paved the way for a greater 
emphasis on the context of the dispute, but the law remains plagued by inconsistencies as a 
result of attempting to fit relationality into the existing liberal framework. Of particular 
difficulty is the fact that the liberal model is resistant to intrusion into the family or ‘private 
sphere’. Relational vulnerability rejects the privatisation of intimacy, arguing that it has 
historically permitted numerous inequalities to go unchallenged and allowed one party to profit 
at the expense of the other. It instead envisages an active and responsive state that is able to 
redress the imbalances that have occurred over the course of the relationship.  
The limitations of liberal theory- privacy and autonomy 
The concept of separate spheres, in which the family is presented as clearly distinct from public 
or political life underlies liberal theory.55 The family traditionally inhabits the private sphere, 
into which the state should not intrude. There is extensive scholarship on these separate 
spheres, spanning numerous areas of law, the majority of which is beyond the scope of this 
article.56 Instead, the reference to separate spheres is simply used in relation to the tendency of 
liberal theorists to draw a distinction between public and private life.57   
Under the liberal model, the intimate relationship itself is an expression of autonomy, of the 
freedom to be governed by one’s own law. Cohen argues that under the classic liberal model, 
the ability to purse intimate relationships is viewed as central to the individual pursuit of 
                                                          
52 See Gissing v Gissing [1971]AC 886 and Pettit v Pettit [1970]AC 777 
53 Stack v Dowden [2007]UKHL 17 
54 Thorner v Major [2009]UKHL 18 
55 John Rawls, ‘Political Liberalism ’ (1993)  New York: Columbia UP, 137 
56 For further discussion of the literature, see Ruth Gavison, ‘Feminism and the public/private distinction’ (1992)  Stan L 
Rev 1 
57 See Morton J Horwitz, ‘The history of the public/private distinction’ (1982)  University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
1423 for the historical development of the separate spheres doctrine.  
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happiness.58 Karst has argued that it is the choice to form and maintain an intimate relation that 
permits full realisation of the human values that we cherish the most.59 He refers to the 
importance of affording individuals the opportunity to care and be cared for and to form a 
commitment to other individuals.60 In this sense, Karst argues that intimate relationships play 
a key role in shaping individual identity and can impact on how an individual defines himself.61 
Karst’s theory is non-interventionist in that it views regulation and intrusion into intimate 
relationships as fundamentally negative. Karst is ultimately concerned with protecting 
individual freedom (through the restrained state), similar to the aims of Kantian theory.  
A major critique of liberal theories of intimacy from a relational vulnerability perspective is 
the assumption that the parties are free in their relationships. For example, Karst points out that 
the benefits of intimate association are only realised where the parties have freedom of choice 
to enter the relationship.62 Commitment between the parties is of a voluntary nature and based 
on affection rather than a legal duty. Similarly, Dagan argues that a fundamental principle of 
personal relationships of trust and reciprocity is the liberal commitment to free exit. 63  Rawls’ 
theory provides that “particular associations may be freely organized as their members wish, 
and they may have their own internal life and discipline subject to the restriction that their 
members have a real choice of whether to continue their affiliation.”64 The underlying 
assumption is that parties in an intimate relationship have freely chosen to enter that 
relationship and equally have free choice as to how long the relationship continues. Essentially, 
it is based on the fictional autonomous liberal subject, a self-sufficient and unburdened 
individual. Additionally, because the liberal subject is unburdened, liberal accounts can have a 
                                                          
58 Jean L Cohen Regulating intimacy: A new legal paradigm (Princeton university press, 2009) 
59 Kenneth L Karst, ‘The freedom of intimate association’ (1980) 89 The Yale Law Journal 624 
60 Ibid, 632 
61 Ibid, 636 
62 Ibid, 633 
63 Hanoch Dagan The Law and Ethics of Restitution (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 196 
64Rawls 1971, above at n 8, 186 
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tendency to excessively romanticise intimate relationships by assuming that, as they are freely 
chosen, they are based purely on affection and mutual benefit.  
The right to privacy in liberal theory also extends to the choice of form of one’s relationships. 
Supporters of the liberal position make much of the fact that unmarried partners have made the 
choice not to marry and that this choice should be afforded respect. Deech’s argument against 
the legal recognition of cohabitation asks the question “[i]f cohabitants are dissatisfied with 
their legal position and believe that they suffer injustice, the question must be asked “Why 
don’t they marry?””65 Although Deech claims to be critical of the tendency to treat the family 
as a unit and prefers a more individualistic focus, her statement presumes that the decision not 
to marry is a joint one and that the relationship is one where both parties are able to assert their 
autonomy.  Debates about the failure of couples to marry usually centre on the perceived lack 
of commitment between them.  As Rowthorn claims, “if heterosexuals choose to cohabit 
instead of getting married this indicates something about the likely stability of their 
relationship.” 66  What underlies Rowthorn’s statement is again an assumption that both parties 
have freely chosen to conduct their relationship in a certain manner and that the possibility of 
marriage has been considered and discounted by them both. It also seeks to privatise the 
potential future vulnerability of cohabitees by presenting their choice as a failed opportunity to 
protect themselves. 
Empirical research by Barlow and Smithson has suggested that this view of choice is far from 
accurate. The authors identified a number of reasons why some cohabitants do not get married. 
While some of these related to both parties having an ideological opposition to marriage, the 
research identified that a number of participants fell into the category of “uneven couples”,67 
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where one partner did hope to marry but the other did not. Usually, it was the economically 
stronger partner who was resistant to marriage.68 The weaker partner often displayed some 
hope that marriage would still take place in the future. Barlow and Smithson also found that 
these relationships frequently displayed other signs of inequality, such as an absence of sharing 
intention, characterised by the parties keeping separate bank accounts.69  
It is erroneous to assume that all cohabiting relationships commence due to an internal desire 
on the part of the individual to care for another and to be cared for as suggested by Karst. The 
assumption of free entry and exit is also a fallacy. For example, a consequence of rising house 
prices against stagnant wages has led to an increase in diverse forms of cohabitation, including 
families of multiple generations living together.70 There may also be a sense of moral obligation 
to take in an ailing or elderly family member in order to assist with caring.  
Additionally, the assumption that there is free exit from cohabitation can create an image of 
the separating cohabitants as freely having made the decision to leave the relationship, 
something that has been criticised by Daly and Scheiwe.71 The suggestion is that if one partner 
is not happy for example with the other’s unwillingness to marry, he or she has the option to 
exit the relationship. For example, Scott argues that one partner could make it clear to the other 
that he has no intention of sharing assets, leaving his partner open to “make an informed choice 
whether to end the union or remain in a role that leaves her financially vulnerable.”72  This of 
course presupposes that exit is a realistic option and seeks to downplay the financial and 
emotional obstacles that may prevent this freedom.  Liberal theory fails to recognise that the 
claimant operates within certain relational restraints that influence decision making. Just as 
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with factors motivating entry to the relationship, economic, emotional and moral factors can 
determine an individual’s decision to remain in a relationship that does not appear to offer the 
prospects initially hoped for. In addition, it does not account for the fact that exit from the 
relationship will be significantly easier for the economically stronger party and that this leaves 
the financially weaker party vulnerable to the potential termination of the relationship, 
something that may influence autonomy and bargaining power.  
I suggest that the manner in which liberal theory depicts the intimate relationship, particularly 
its emphasis on the restrained state, has permitted and legitimised numerous inequalities to take 
place within the family unit. In the case of traditional role allocation, it has enabled the 
breadwinner to be relieved of responsibility and obligation at the homemaker’s expense. It is 
this imbalance that relational vulnerability seeks to address, encouraging the state to respond 
directly and to correct it. The theory also avoids excessively romanticising intimate 
relationships, by instead depicting them as a potential source of vulnerability.    
The relationship as a source of vulnerability  
I should clarify that I do not suggest that relationships that cause vulnerability necessarily 
involve the abuse of one partner by the other. Nor do I imply that it needs to be proved that one 
party has acted in an unconscionable manner. Rather, the vulnerability has arisen due to the 
manner in which the parties have conducted themselves during the relationship. This is not 
necessarily merely a matter of individual decision making of the parties.  Wider factors such 
as social norms and conventions as well as the availability of state support or subsidy will 
impact on the parties’ decision to allocate tasks. Of course, relationships that are physically or 
emotionally abusive may be even more likely to cause a significant level of financial 
vulnerability, but it should not be assumed that imbalanced relationships are abusive.  
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This section focuses on the impact of this vulnerability, particularly in relation to those who 
become vulnerable as a result of providing care. Fineman argues that individuals who bear the 
responsibility of caring for inevitable dependants such as infants and the elderly, risk becoming 
“derivatively” dependent as a result.73 The privatisation of care under the liberal model means 
that it is the responsibility of each family unit to ensure that the needs of dependents are met. 
The replacement cost of unpaid caring in the UK has been estimated at £87bn by Carers UK, a 
sum that would otherwise need to be paid by the state.74 Unpaid labour, especially that 
involving caring for dependants, will often mean one partner becoming dependent on the other. 
Although he or she may return to work at a later date, this is often in a reduced capacity with 
wages being used for childcare.75  
There is no enforceable legal obligation to financially maintain one’s unmarried partner, either 
during the relationship or after its end.76 The vulnerability faced by those in unmarried 
partnerships who carry out caring work is therefore potentially increased. It is also usually only 
when the relationship breaks down that the vulnerability becomes evident.   
Relational vulnerability theory acknowledges the element of economic sacrifice that is 
involved in caring work. In relation to divorcing spouses, it has been recognised that one spouse 
may be required to compensate the other for financial sacrifice made for the good of the 
marriage.77 While the principle of compensation may not be relevant to all unmarried 
relationships, I argue that there needs to be recognition of the financial sacrifice made by the 
carer and that this cannot be painted in terms of individual choice, as it currently is.  
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Vulnerability theory recognises that is not only the intimate relationship and the private nature 
of the family that serve to exacerbate vulnerability for those more susceptible to it; but that for 
the recipients of unpaid caring, the relationship serves to increase their resilience to 
vulnerability. In terms of assessing the value of unpaid labour, it is asked whether the claimant 
would have carried out the work in any event, regardless of an expectation of an interest in the 
property.78 It is generally only when the answer to that question is ‘no’ that the court will find 
that there is detrimental reliance. There is little attention given to the potential value to the 
recipient and when there is, this tends to be in economic terms.79 A purely economic analysis 
ignores the potential non-monetary benefits to the recipient of unpaid labour. Fineman’s 
concept of resilience on the other hand includes both economic resilience and emotional 
resilience.80 She also acknowledges the wider benefit to society of unpaid caring in order to 
provide the conditions necessary for individuals to become independent and autonomous.81  
Liberal theory also ignores the effect of unpaid labour on the power balance between the 
parties. As outlined above, caring or performing unpaid domestic or other work can involve 
one party making an economic sacrifice.  Often, there is a commensurate benefit to the other 
party, who may be relieved of obligations as a result. I also argue that there is an impact on the 
power dynamic between the parties as a result of the economic imbalance that the relationship 
causes. In particular, the stronger party has more bargaining power in terms of how assets are 
owned and how resources are distributed. Using Fineman’s concept of derivative dependency 
the financially vulnerable party is to an extent at the mercy of the stronger party’s good will, 
as there is no legal right to insist on being maintained. It is therefore particularly inappropriate 
to use a model that presumes freedom of bargaining power.  
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An emphasis on autonomy, private ordering, and bargaining also means that it becomes 
possible for the economically stronger party to protect himself against the effects of the 
relationship by simply communicating an unwillingness to share to his partner. In both 
Thomson v Humphries and Geary v Rankine, the defendant’s clear communication of an 
unwillingness to share meant that it would be unreasonable under the circumstances for the 
claimant to expect a share in the property. As Margulies has argued in the context of prenuptial 
agreements, expressing individualistic sentiments can render the stronger party almost 
invulnerable. 82  In this sense, an individualistic outlook acts to the advantage of the financially 
dominant partner.  
Relational vulnerability as a preferable basis for redistribution of assets 
Relational vulnerability enables redistribution of property on the basis of desert (or reward) in 
recognition of unpaid work and also as a means of compensating the vulnerable party for 
economic sacrifice. In contrast to liberal theory, it is able to acknowledge the inherent value of 
caring work, to the recipient, to society and to other individuals whose own obligations are 
reduced as a result of the caregiver’s work. As Herring argues, the legal system is based on “an 
obsession with the production of economic value.”83 This fixation on economic value is evident 
throughout the law on constructive trusts, which prioritises financial contributions over non-
financial ones. The liberal model is also based on an understanding that property rights are 
inviolable and symbolic of autonomy. The liberal understanding of property underlying the law 
of constructive trusts and estoppel has permitted vulnerabilities to arise and has helped to affirm 
the low status of caring work in society.84   
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Relational vulnerability, in contrast to liberal theory, is based on recognition that caring for 
others is an essential part of humanity. As Herring argues, “caring is the rock on which society 
stands”.85 Even a society that values economic independence and freedom above all else must 
concede that attaining autonomy depends on nurture and effective instilling of values during 
childhood and adolescence. Social problems are often attributed to a lack of care, such as 
childhood neglect or poverty. Despite this, caring remains confined to the private sphere and 
is expected to be carried out for little or no remuneration.  
Caring is not seen as a concern for the English law of property. In fact, suggestions to 
incorporate a more generous approach to contributions in the constructive trust have been 
viewed as a threat to the doctrinal purity of property law.86 The constructive trust case law 
reveals that distinctions between ‘relationship’ on the one hand and ‘property’ on the other are 
often made.87  Those contributions that relate directly to the relationship are thought to be too 
remote to generate proprietary rights. Relational vulnerability challenges this distinction and 
argues that it permits inequalities within intimate relationships to remain. Particularly where 
the property in question is the family home, it becomes difficult to separate it from the 
relationship. The artificial distinction between property and relationship is simply another 
example of preference being given to economic activity over domestic or caring work. Because 
vulnerability theory attaches direct value to the act of caring and views it as invaluable both for 
society and for the recipient, it provides a basis for which caring work can be rewarded on the 
basis of desert. Concerns about redistribution in order to meet social goals can therefore be 
addressed on the basis that caring contributions can be viewed as equally valuable to monetary 
ones.  
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Liberal theory and the concept of ‘altruism’  
Relational vulnerability theory challenges the tendency of liberal theory to use altruism as a 
justification for denying recovery. This is because a vulnerability-based regime would 
recognise caring contributions as valuable in themselves, rather than focus on whether they 
were performed with economic gain in mind.  
While liberal accounts expect selfishness in the marketplace, in the unregulated private sphere, 
this behaviour is at odds with the idealistic model of the family. Horsburgh suggests that the 
law does not recognise or regulate altruism due to its potential threat to individualism and its 
incompatibility with the bargain-model of human behaviour. 88 Furthermore, Olsen argues that 
expectations of altruism pervade the family. 89  Often, these expectations are defined according 
to gendered standards, with wives and mothers in particular being depicted as carers. Similarly, 
Pohjonen has argued that love itself is presented as being unselfish and that performing caring 
acts towards one’s partner is viewed as a natural part of the relationship and one that is beyond 
legal intervention.90  
In the domestic property context, I argue that liberal theory conveys an expectation of altruism 
in the family by only rewarding or recognising those acts that are motivated by individual gain. 
Reward for caring work is precluded because caring is thought to be a natural part of an intimate 
relationship or family unit. In my account of relational vulnerability, I do not deny that caring 
is a natural part of a relationship and I certainly do not seek to suggest that carers are acting 
with financial motivation. However, where relational vulnerability differs from liberal theory 
is in its recognition that the expectation of altruism seeks to perpetuate inequality. Relational 
vulnerability envisages a state that actively values caring and provides the supportive 
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environment in which it can be carried out. This environment is not provided by the liberal 
model of the restrained state.  
In responding to non-financial contributions, the law tends to draw a distinction between those 
acts that are considered to be a natural part of an intimate relationship and those that are not. 
Financial compensation or desert is generally only recognised where the caregiver has gone 
‘above and beyond’ the moral duty or expectation of altruism. Expectations of altruism will 
differ depending on the nature of the parties’ relationship. For example, Sloan makes the 
distinction between those who care for family members or partners and ‘pure’ carers who have 
no relationship to the recipient other than as a carer.91 Sloan has argued that the latter may find 
it easier to argue that their work should be compensated, as there is no moral obligation on 
them to perform services.92 Often where the relationship is spousal (or tantamount to spousal), 
domestic contributions or other forms of caring work is seen as natural or inevitable and 
therefore incapable of giving rise to property rights.93  However, where the parties are not in a 
conjugal relationship, there may be a greater inclination on the part of the judiciary to accept 
that the claimant should receive some form of recompense for the work. Because the concept 
of caring is seen as incompatible with financial motivations, the courts instead tend to recast 
the relationship as being commercial in nature in order to allow recovery.   
In the estoppel case Thorner v Major, the claimant, David Thorner, assisted his father’s cousin, 
Peter Thorner, in his farming business for a period of nearly 30 years. This involved the 
claimant working on the farm unpaid but also providing companionship and assistance to Peter. 
Some years after the claimant had started work on the farm, Peter implied to him that he would 
inherit the farm. The claimant continued to work on the farm until Peter died in 2005. Despite 
his assurance regarding inheritance, Peter died intestate and the farm was distributed according 
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to the statutory intestacy rules.94 In allowing the claimant’s appeal, the House of Lords focused 
on the link between the assurance given by Peter and the claimant carrying on the unpaid work. 
Despite the fact that the claimant had already been working unpaid for a number of years when 
Peter gave the assurance about inheritance, it was suggested that the claimant’s work was 
conditional on his inheritance. This conflicted somewhat with the additional finding that the 
claimant would probably not have raised any objections had the farm needed to be sold in order 
to pay for Peter’s nursing care.95 In addition, the claimant also carried out work on his parents’ 
farm for a nominal amount of ‘pocket-money’.96 These two factors could be taken to suggest 
that the claimant was not motivated by financial gain and rather carried out the work out of a 
sense of loyalty and affection for Peter and his parents. However, using a liberal theoretical 
model, it would be difficult to incorporate the caring on the basis of the claimant’s affection 
for his relatives or his sense of moral duty. As a result, the caring elements of the relationship 
were downplayed in favour of commercial considerations.  
In Wayling v Jones,97 the claimant was in a long term same-sex relationship with the deceased. 
During the course of the relationship, the claimant carried out a significant amount of unpaid 
work in hotels owned by the deceased. The deceased had on several occasions made assurances 
to the claimant that he stood to inherit the hotels on his death, a promise that he failed to honour. 
In holding that the deceased’s estate was estopped from denying the claimant an interest, the 
Court of Appeal held that had it not been for the assurances made by the deceased that the 
claimant would not have carried out the work. In his evidence, the claimant said that if the 
deceased had told him that he was no longer to receive an interest, he would have left the 
relationship.98 However, he also said that if the deceased had never made the promise of a 
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share, this would not have affected his decision to have a relationship with him99. Flynn and 
Lawson have remarked on the court’s commercial analysis of the parties’ relationship. They 
argue that the reason the claimant would have left the relationship, had he been told that he 
would no longer receive a share, was because it would represent a betrayal by the deceased and 
demonstrate that the claimant’s work was not valued.100 The economic analysis of the 
relationship cannot explain the apparent conflict in the claimant’s motivations.  
Similarly, in Greasley v Cooke,101 the claimant had originally worked as a housekeeper for the 
deceased’s family. She subsequently began a relationship with one of the family members and 
on his assurances, stayed on as a housekeeper, working without recompense after receiving an 
assurance that she would always have a home. Her work included caring for a disabled family 
member. In finding that the deceased’s estate was estopped from denying her a right of 
occupation, the emphasis was again placed on the fact that the claimant had prejudiced herself 
financially by continuing to work for the family. It was also suggested that she may well have 
pursued other employment opportunities had she known that she would not be permitted to 
stay in the property.  
From a vulnerability perspective, the reasoning in Thorner, Wayling and Greasley shows the 
need for the judiciary to recast the terms of the parties’ relationship in order to make it 
compatible with the ideal of the autonomous subject. Essentially, the act of caring conflicts 
with individual autonomy because it is not always, or entirely, motivated by financial 
recompense. In Thorner, it was emphasised that the claimant had “other opportunities” that he 
was considering, although the details of these were not elaborated on.102 Despite the fact that 
the claimant had already been helping his relative and was also working largely unpaid for his 
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parents, the House of Lords judgment suggests that he would consider the work alongside other 
employment opportunities and take the most lucrative one. The fact that the claimant might 
feel motivated by other factors in order to assist his relative irrespective of whether he was 
financially rewarded would not fit with the autonomous ideal.  
According to Kennedy, altruistic acts will expose the caregiver to “a vulnerability to non-
reciprocity.”103 Care-giving involves taking a risk that the recipient will not fully appreciate 
the sacrifice made or will not reciprocate affection. The caregiver is sometimes criticised for 
failing to negotiate a return for her acts. For example, Sherwin argues that cohabitants ‘know 
the score’ when deciding to perform unpaid work.104 She argues that making contributions 
involves an assumption of risk on the part of the contributor, who should not expect 
recompense at a later date. It is clear from Sherwin’s account that she believes that the risk is 
both understood and freely assumed by the parties.  
Despite the emphasis on individualism in the marketplace, selfish behaviour within the family 
context is not encouraged as it might render other family members dependent on the state for 
support. Waldron has argued that the very idea of asserting individual rights within intimate 
relationships is viewed as unattractive.105  The constructive trust case law shows distaste for 
any suggestion that parties are financially motivated within their relationship, particularly so 
where it is a marital or marriage-like partnership.106 Communitarian principles are more likely 
to be compatible with marriage or marriage-like relationships.107 Although the basis for the 
constructive trust is intention, it is cases where there is evidently no intention and the parties 
have been motivated solely by love that the court is often prepared to be more generous at the 
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quantification stage, such as in Midland Bank v Cooke, where the claimant was awarded a 40% 
share, despite having contributed only 6.5% to the purchase price. In the bankruptcy case of 
Rubin v Dweck108 on the other hand, the wife’s insistence on a share of the matrimonial home 
in return for very substantial financial contributions was described as “mercenary”.109 
Relational vulnerability theory challenges the concepts of altruism and risk within cohabiting 
relationships. It suggests that liberal theory employs the rhetoric of altruism to ensure that 
obligations of caring are confined within the family and do not become the responsibility of 
the state. Because altruism and affection are reserved for the private family setting, liberal 
theory struggles to justify financial reward based on desert or compensation. Vulnerability 
theory confronts the supposed public/private divide and argues that the state through legal and 
political policy is able to address the issue of unpaid work within the family.  Secondly, 
vulnerability theory rejects the bargaining model that is endorsed by liberal theory, as this 
presents a false notion of choice and freedom. Instead, there is recognition of the constraints 
under which individuals operate within the intimate relationship, meaning that recovery should 
not be denied on the basis that the claimant has taken a risk.  
Moving beyond welfare 
This section seeks to address the concern that by advocating a response to vulnerability, the 
theory is at risk of sacrificing certainty and principle in a bid to respond to the welfare of the 
parties. Welfare based theories potentially act as a threat to individual autonomy, both in the 
sense that they would permit redistribution of resources in order to meet the needs of particular 
individuals, and in the sense that they can be paternalistic towards those that they seek to 
protect. I argue that a vulnerability account is in fact compatible with commitment to respect 
for autonomy and is different to a theory based solely on welfare.  
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The financial remedies regime under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 is an 
example of a welfare based model of property redistribution. Although the guiding principles 
for distribution have been defined by the courts to be needs, sharing and compensation, it has 
been clarified that the needs of the parties will usually trump other considerations, and it is only 
when needs have been met that the court can consider issues such as compensation.110 The case 
law makes a distinction between relationship-generated need and other needs, but the section 
25 factors include reference to age and disability, neither of which are generated by the 
relationship. The prevalence given to needs under the legislation could be viewed as 
paternalistic, permitting interference with ownership rights and future income in order to meet 
the needs of vulnerable individuals.  
Vulnerability theory contains elements of paternalism, in that it compels the state to be actively 
responsive to vulnerability. However, as Bailey-Harris has argued, a certain degree of 
paternalism is needed in order to recognise power imbalances within family relationships and 
to respond to inequality.111 As argued above, the restrained state is not absent. Its failure to 
intervene to address imbalances within intimate relationships simply means that these are 
tolerated and normalised.  Within liberal theory, paternalism is seen as the antithesis to 
autonomy and freedom. State power is regarded as oppressive and threatening.  
Vulnerability theory is not necessarily incompatible with autonomy, although there is some 
divergence on this issue in the literature. For Fineman, autonomy is a hollow concept that seeks 
to promote economic self-sufficiency above all else. Individuals who fall short of the 
autonomous ideal are stigmatised by society for failing to take the opportunities that are 
presented as being available to all citizens.112 An autonomy-based approach can never, in her 
view, accommodate caring work because this is contrary to the image of the self-interested and 
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economically motivated autonomous legal subject. Mackenzie has criticised Fineman for 
relying on the narrow, Kantian version of autonomy in her theory.113 She suggests instead that 
vulnerability theory can make use of the reconceptualised version of autonomy provided by 
relational theorists. Relational theorists argue that autonomy must be understood in the context 
that people are socially embedded and defined largely by their relationships with others. As 
Nedelsky argues, “autonomy is made possible by constructive relationships- including 
intimate, cultural, institutional- all of which interact.”114  Mackenzie and Stoljar have further 
critiqued the fact that liberalism views the self as being defined separately to and prior to 
interrelationships.115 In addition, liberal accounts of autonomy view goals as being self-chosen 
by the agent. Relational accounts acknowledge that while this is true in respect of some goals, 
other goals will be directly shaped by relational influences. The idea of an individual acting for 
the benefit of others rather than the self (what liberal theorists would term ‘altruism’) can be 
incorporated into a relational account of autonomy. Intimacy is therefore not necessarily 
something that contradicts or threatens autonomy.  
Rather than regarding all intimate relationships as a potential threat to individual autonomy, 
relational theorists argue that there are certain relationships that are harmful to autonomy, such 
as those where there is substantial inequality between the partners. As Nedelsky argues, the 
purpose of a relational approach is not to argue for the preservation of all relationships, but to 
distinguish between those that foster autonomy and those that do not.116 Liberal theory is unable 
to make this distinction as the internalist account is merely concerned with whether the 
individual exercised free choice in entering the relationship. For example, Oshana argues that 
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the internalist account would seem to permit states of being such as voluntary slavery and 
subservience which are oppressive and contrary to autonomy, provided that the individual 
freely chooses them.117 In order to explain why certain relationships are oppressive, it is 
necessary to consider conditions that are external to the individual.  
Like Fineman, relational theorists are critical of the separate spheres ideology. Nedelsky has 
criticised the liberal concept of the minimal state and the notion of unconstrained freedom of 
choice. She argues that these are based on an illusory view of individual autonomy as creating 
a bounded sphere into which the state cannot enter.118 Collectivity is seen as being incompatible 
with and in conflict with autonomy and we are told that there is an inevitable trade-off between 
the two. Nedelsky argues for a reconceptualization of autonomy, to be based on the caring 
relationship.119 Although sharing Fineman’s commitment to reconceptualising the family to be 
based on the caring relationship, Nedelsky’s account does not seek to dismiss autonomy.  
Mackenzie warns that that the risk of rejecting autonomy in favour of the more nebulous 
concept of equality is that responses to vulnerability may be overly paternalistic, painting the 
vulnerable subject as somebody who is a victim of an unequal society.120 She argues that this 
adds to the sense of loss of agency that often accompanies vulnerability. Mackenzie suggests 
that a relational account of autonomy offers a better way forward in terms of empowering the 
vulnerable subject and providing him or her with resilience.121  
I do not suggest that autonomy as a concept should be abandoned entirely in domestic property 
disputes. Instead, it needs to be understood in a manner that incorporates relational elements 
and that acknowledges that within intimate relationships, individual choice takes place within 
the constraints of the relationship. It is also necessary to distinguish between a regime where 
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vulnerability itself grounds an obligation and one where vulnerability serves as an indicator of 
an obligation. Within the proposed theory of vulnerability, the obligation on the legal owner to 
transfer property to the beneficiary is based on relationship-generated inequality. I have made 
the argument that vulnerabilities that are not generated by the relationship should not be the 
focus of property redistribution. In instances where the vulnerability is an inherent one (such 
as disability), I would envisage a more direct state response, in the form of financial subsidies. 
Although I argue that property redistribution is a form of state intervention, this is in response 
to inequalities created in a relationship, rather than general need. The vulnerability serves as 
an indicator of the relational imbalance. There is a danger that a general obligation towards 
intimate partners would simply reinforce the idea of private responsibility for dependency.  I 
am also concerned that a theory that merely responds to vulnerability (or welfare), rather than 
inequality, would risk depicting the vulnerable subject as a disempowered victim. That said, I 
do acknowledge that certain inherent vulnerabilities such as illness and age may serve to 
exacerbate relationship-generated ones. The two cannot therefore be entirely separated, 
although relational vulnerability focuses on economic sacrifice.  
Conclusion 
English property and trusts law can be said to conform to a theoretical model of liberal 
individualism, whereby the role of the state is restrained. The fundamental problem with this 
model is that, for a variety of reasons, it is not suitable in the domestic context. I have argued 
here that vulnerability theory offers a preferable perspective. Vulnerability, defined as a 
reduced capacity to deal with the effects of relationship breakdown, can be caused in various 
ways. I have adopted a narrow version of the theory because in the context of property disputes, 
a broad version of vulnerability would fail to distinguish between those cases where 
vulnerability is inherent and those where it is caused by the relationship itself. In addition, I 
have argued that it is not merely the vulnerability itself that creates the obligation to transfer 
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property, but rather that the vulnerability serves as an indicator of a relational imbalance. It is 
this imbalance that grounds the obligation on the other party to transfer property. In common 
with other vulnerability theorists, I argue that the state needs to take an active role in responding 
to inequality within intimate relationships. Therefore, the traditional division between the 
public and the private domain needs to be challenged. In the area of property disputes, state 
intervention would either take the form of legislation or a more active judiciary that is prepared 
to make policy-based statements that unpaid caring work is of value both to the recipient and 
to society as a whole.  
The unmarried relationship should be viewed as a vulnerable institution in itself. Protection 
and benefits for unmarried couples do not exist in the manner that they do for their married 
counterparts. The unmarried relationship also tends to be viewed as unstable in comparison to 
marriage. However, dependency and caring within the unmarried family is privatised, as it is 
in the married family. The unmarried family is expected to be economically self-sufficient in 
order to avoid becoming a burden on the state. This is enforced through measures such as child 
support legislation and social security legislation, which reduces benefits when the recipient 
cohabits. While there is recognition in matrimonial law of the economic impact of caring, there 
is no equivalent right to seek financial support on the breakdown of the unmarried family. 
Relationship imbalance is therefore likely to be particularly prevalent in the unmarried family 
with few economic consequences for the economically stronger partner on exiting the 
relationship.   
Relational vulnerability theory addresses some of the problematic aspects of the liberal model. 
In recognising not only the value of caregiving, but the fundamental economic impact it has, 
the theory is able to justify awarding the caregiver rights on the basis of desert, rather than 
making use of paternalistic concepts such as welfare and needs. As a result, this version of 
vulnerability theory is not incompatible with individual autonomy. However, in common with 
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proponents of relational autonomy theory, it recognises that individuals are both characterised 
and constrained by their interpersonal relationships. A vulnerability-based perspective would 
enable this to be recognised, rather than relying on judges to distort the nature of the parties’ 
relationship in order to make it fit with the traditional model. It would also recognise the 
fictitious nature of free choice within intimate relationships. The liberal model is unlikely to 
ever be able to bridge the gap between ‘family law’ and ‘property law’ and vulnerability theory 
offers the opportunity for a new perspective.  
 
